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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of Aid Effectiveness in Enhancing Governance:  
Geographical Location, Legal Origin, and Religious Diversity 
 
By 
Jineui Kim 
 
 
 
Along with the long history of aid industry, aid effectiveness has come to mixed conclusions 
in literature.  Using the data from 136 countries between 2002 and 2009, this paper explores 
external determinants of aid effectiveness in enhancing governance.  In order to capture 
more precise impact of aid on governance, only the aid amount, which has a policy objective 
on good governance, is considered.  This paper provides evidence that aid promotes good 
governance, conditional on geographical location, legal origin, and religious diversity.  
Given aid for governance, aid significantly enhances governance in countries located in Sub-
Saharan Africa, in countries with civil law tradition, and in countries with less religious 
tension.  Also, among various dimensions of governance, only ‘Political stability and 
absence of violence’ indicator turns out to be positively influenced by aid in overall countries, 
while others are limitedly affected.  These findings support the need for donors to select 
development assistance projects with great caution, considering the exogenous factors of each 
recipient country and target governance quality that needs to be enhanced.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 
     The United Nations proclaimed the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2000, 
which includes a target to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.  In order to meet the target, 
funding for official development assistance (ODA) has more than doubled over the last 
decade, from 54.8 billion in 2002 to 135.1 billion in 2009.  Along with this trend, as shown 
in Figure 1, funding to promote good governance in developing countries has almost 
quadrupled from 8.6 billion to 30.6 billion during the same period.
1
  More rapid growth in 
governance-related aid reflects the widely acknowledged notion that good governance is an 
indispensable factor for both economic and social development. 
The concept of ‘good governance’ became prominent around 1989-90 in international 
aid industry.  By adding the adjective ‘good,’ the way a country is governed is deemed 
important and the procedures and quality of governance are broadly evaluated.
2
  Since the 
Paris Declaration advocated the enhancement of aid effectiveness in 2005 by achieving its 
five fundamental principles, which are Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for 
Results, and Mutual Accountability, more emphasis has been given to good governance.  
This is because, most importantly, without robust governance, achieving a country’ ownership 
through forging its own development strategy is not feasible.  In addition, it is hard to expect 
the government to use aid wisely or effectively for the development if the rules and 
institutions are not abided by its citizens, if the country suffers from political tension, if the 
                                           
1  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “OECD.StatExtracts,” 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW (accessed June 6, 2011). 
2
 Deborah Brautigam and Stephen Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 2 (2004): 276.   
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government is incompetent, and if the process of building and managing government is 
corrupted.  For these reasons, many donors include the improvement of governance as a 
major objective of their aid activities.  
Despite time, money, and efforts the world spent for good governance, however, 
whether foreign aid is helpful in enhancing governance is still under debate.  A large number 
of studies related to this issue have come to mixed conclusions.  Some researchers argue that 
aid has no significant impact on governance and others demonstrate that it rather works 
against good governance.  Only a small number of literatures suggest the improvement of 
governance through external aid.  However, most previous studies have limitations in their 
aid data.  They use the total amount of aid regardless of its policy objective but this could 
impede accurate analysis of the relationship between aid and governance.  In light of this 
shortcoming, this study limits the scope of aid only to the amount that donors claim its 
purpose is to promote governance.  By using a specified aid amount, this study intends to 
find out its more precise impact on governance.   
In addition, this paper tries to determine meaningful exogenous factors, which could 
explain the aid’s different levels of impact on governance.  As a result, it finds evidence that 
higher aid levels are associated with larger improvement in governance only in countries with 
specific geographical location, legal origin, and religious diversity.  Furthermore, a closer 
look at the six individual governance indicators leads to the findings that only “Political 
stability and absence of violence” has a strong causal relationship with aid in overall countries. 
This study examines the issue empirically, using 136 country data over the 2002-2009 
periods.  Change in governance value between 2002 and 2009 is used as a dependent 
variable and average value of Aid/GDP ratio during the same period is used as an independent 
variable of interest.  Numerous control and instrumental variables are also considered. 
Chapter two examines how aid can influence governance and reviews literatures on aid-
3 
 
governance nexus.  Chapter three provides research method and data used in this study. 
Chapter four explains findings from this analysis.  Lastly, policy recommendations are 
discussed in chapter five. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
There is a common understanding that an effective aid based on good governance is 
crucial for development.  Many researchers agree that aid is effective only under good 
quality of governance.  Burnside and Dollar find that foreign aid has a “positive effect on 
growth in a good policy environment” based on the sample of 56 countries during the time 
period from 1970 to 1993.
3
  They again conclude that “aid spurs growth conditional on the 
quality of institutions and policies.”4  Additionally, Kaufmann et al. provide evidence of “a 
strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes”5 and 
Svensson suggests that “long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the degree of 
political and civil liberties in the recipient country.”6  That is, governance matters for social 
and economic development.  
However, there are relatively few researches addressing whether aid contributes to 
better governance.  Theoretically, aid could enhance as well as impair the quality of 
governance.  On the positive side, aid could alleviate the binding revenue constraints of the 
government.  Cash transfer as well as technical assistance enables them to build effective 
institutions, to develop strong bureaucracy and legal system, to recruit competent public 
officials with high salary, and to fight with corruption.  Furthermore, enhanced governance 
could allure foreign investment and increased income and higher tax collection through 
economic growth could in turn be used as additional revenue for enhancing governance.  Aid 
                                           
3
 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” The American Economic Review 90, no. 4 
(2000): 847. 
4
 ---, “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 
3251 (2004): 19.     
5
 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, “Governance Matters,” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper no. 2196 (1999): 2. 
6
 Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy,” Economics and Politics Volume 11 (1999): 275. 
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could be an initiative of a virtuous circle.
7,8 
On the other hand, aid could also block the enhancement of governance.  Aid might 
increase political instability by encouraging groups to compete with each other to have a 
control on the fund.  Also, it could deteriorate governmental accountability by making the 
host countries to be more dependent on the external funding rather than its citizens.  In 
addition, larger investment in public sector could weaken private sector, which is the engine 
of growth.  Lastly, moral hazard, rent seeking, and free-rider problems could lead to 
corruption resulting in the delay or inhibition of necessary government reform.  Since good 
governance is profitable to everyone but gives no private gains to executers, people have little 
incentive to pursue it.
9,10
  Though unintended, especially when the aid is delivered over a 
long period of time, aid could undermine governance quality.   
In an empirical test, Knack provides evidence that “higher aid levels erode the quality 
of governance.”11  He uses governance indices from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) which measures bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law.  He creates 
ICRG index by summing up these three six-point scales indices.  As a measurement for aid 
intensity, he uses ODA as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) and as a percentage of 
government expenditures.  Brautigam and Knack also examine aid and governance quality in 
African region, finding “robust statistical relationship between high aid levels in Africa and 
deteriorations in governance.” 12   In addition, Svensson provides empirical evidence 
explaining the positive relationship between aid and corruption in countries where there are 
                                           
7
 Matthias Busse and Steffen Groning, “Does Foreign Aid Improve Governance?” Economic Letters 104 (2009): 
76. 
8
 Stephen Knack, “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests,” Southern 
Economic Journal 68, no.2(2001): 311-314. 
9
 Busse and Groning, “Does Foreign Aid Improve Governance?” 76. 
10
 Knack, “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance,” 311-314. 
11
 Ibid, 310. 
12
 Brautigam and Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 276. 
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powerful competing social groups” in a country.13   He uses ethnic diversity as a measure of 
the likelihood of competing social groups in a country. 
There are also empirical researches demonstrating no significant impact of aid on 
governance.   Burnside and Dollar argue that “there has not been any systematic influence 
of aid on policy.”14  Also, when limiting the concept of governance to democracy only, 
Stephen finds no evidence that aid promotes democracy, using a large data over the period of 
1975-2000.
15
  This could be possible when negative impact of aid offsets its positive impact.   
This research differs from the previous studies in a sense that it limits the scope of aid to 
the amount aiming at good governance.  Also, by limiting the time period, it tries to see the 
most recent trend of aid’s effectiveness.   
                                           
13
 Jakob Svensson, “Foreign aid and rent-seeking,” Journal of International Economics no. 51 (2000): 455. 
14
 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
no. 1777 (1997): 30.    
15
 Stephen Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004): 251. 
 
7 
 
 
III. Research method and Data 
 
 
Analyzing cross-country data, this study tries to find out the relationship between aid 
and governance.  It is based on the sample of 136 countries and the time period from 2002 to 
2009 when both aid and governance data are available as well as reliable.  By limiting the 
time period, this paper avoids relatively unreliable sources before 2002 and concentrates only 
on the recent trend.  
The main hypothesis to be tested here is that aid provides positive impact on 
governance.  If that is true, then countries with higher aid level should have bigger 
enhancement in governance quality when all the other things are equal.  In order to 
demonstrate the aid-governance nexus, change in governance indicator, which is calculated by 
subtracting the initial period (2002) governance value from the end of period (2009) value, is 
used as a dependent variable and average value of Aid/GDP during the same period is used as 
an independent variable of interest.  Additionally, considerable number of control and 
instrumental variables is considered in the analysis.   
     Foremost, this study uses the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) from the World 
Bank as a measurement of governance quality.  The World Bank provides aggregate 
subjective indicators which combine the reports from other enterprise, citizen and expert 
survey respondents and covers over the period of 1996-2009.
16
  Six dimensions of WGI are 
‘(1) Voice and accountability,’ ‘(2) Political stability and absence of violence,’ ‘(3) 
Government effectiveness,’ ‘(4) Regulatory quality,’ ‘(5) Rule of law,’ and ‘(6) Control of 
                                           
16
 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
(accessed July 11, 2011). 
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corruption.’  All six components are related to governance and also many issues in 
developing countries.  Individual definitions of each indicator are detailed in Table 1.  Each 
governance indicator used here is scaled from about -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values 
correspond to better governance outcomes.  This study computes a composite governance 
indicator by summing the six indicator values to see the overall quality of governance.  Panel 
B in Table 2 displays the summary statistics of the change in governance value.  
Next, aid measure is calculated as ODA as a share of gross domestic product (GDP).  
Instead of using the total ODA amount, only the amount disbursed for the “Participatory 
development/Good governance” objective is considered.  This is because aid has various 
purposes and including the amount that is not directly related to governance may distort the 
real influence of aid on governance.  By excluding the aid amount that has little connection 
to governance, the study eliminates the biased data and reinforces the precise impact of aid on 
governance.  Annual data on aid for good governance are available from the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
database where most donors report their main objectives of each aid activity.  Average value 
of Aid/GDP is created by taking the mean of the 8 years observations during 2002-2009.  
Panel B in Table 2 also presents summary statistics of the averaged Aid/GDP. 
The quality of governance may be influenced by other factors and this study tries to 
control those variables.  Control and following instrumental variables are nearly identical to 
those used by Stephen Knack .
17
  Control variables include population and GDP change over 
the given period, and initial (2002) governance value.  Population increase could be 
associated with deterioration of governance.  Larger number of people might cause 
difficulties in harmonizing the public opinions, information asymmetry problems and high 
                                           
17
 Knack, “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance,” 311-314. 
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transaction costs.  Change in GDP could also give impact on governance quality.  Increased 
GDP could be conducive to good governance by increasing financial resources from tax 
revenue and solving the binding revenue constraint of government.  Both population and 
GDP data are obtained from the World Bank database.  Lastly, this regression analysis also 
includes initial governance value and, by doing so, controls for the different potential 
opportunities to increase each country’s governance index value.  For instance, countries 
with higher initial WGI have limited opportunity to further increase their governance value, 
considering the fact that the range of WGI is from about -2.5 to 2.5.  Panel B in Table 2 
again shows summary statistics of various control variables used in this analysis.   
In order to solve potential endogeneity issues through 2SLS method, various exogenous 
instrument variables are used.  Initial GNI pc and average in infant mortality rate are good 
indicators for recipient needs.  Also, initial population, and a set of colonial heritage 
dummies (Franc and UK zone dummy) capture donors’ interests.  Panel B in Table 2 
displays summary statistics of these instrumental variables except dummy variables.  
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IV. Analysis and Findings 
 
1. Is there an overall trend? 
 
If aid enhances the quality of governance, then countries receiving higher level of aid 
should exhibit bigger improvement in governance quality when compared to other countries.  
Equation 1 and 2 in Table 3 Panel A report the results using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method respectively.  Since aid level could be responsive 
to observed quality of governance, this test corrects possible reverse causation issue using 
2SLS.  The instruments used in this method are effective, considering the fact that the 
combination of instruments and other variables produces an R
2
 of 0.45 while only 
independent variables produce an R
2
 of 0.15.  All regressions report robust standard errors in 
parentheses and *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
In these regression results, though governance index is correlated with the aid level, no 
evidence is found that aid enhances governance.  That is, the tests confirm that aid on 
balance has been ineffectual in promoting governance in overall recipient countries during the 
period of 2002-2009.  For instance, while Georgia experienced the largest increase in 
governance quality, which is 5.39 point change, Mauritania recorded the largest decline, 
which is -4.72 point change.  Besides the aid level, population change and initial governance 
value are more powerful predictors of WGI change.  10% increase in population results in 
nearly 0.7 point decrease in WGI change and 1 point increase in initial governance value 
leads to a one-tenth point reduction in WGI change.  Changes in GDP are not associated 
with governance in this test, controlling for other variables. 
Not having a significant causal relationship between the two in overall countries does 
11 
 
not necessarily imply that no governance-promoting programs worked as intended.  There 
must be successful programs but the effect might be offset by other unsuccessful programs.  
Also, there might be other exogenous factors that affect the impact of aid.  To figure out 
whether the impact of aid on governance is conditional on certain exogenous variables, this 
study generates additional hypothesis that the impact of aid on governance may differ 
depending on invariant conditions of each country.  These conditions include geographical 
location, legal origin, and religious diversity.  
 
 
2. Does geographical location matter? 
 
 
136 developing countries could be divided into 6 different groups based on their 
geographical locations; East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & 
Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Equation 1 
through 12 in Table 3 Panel B replicate equation 1 and 2 in Panel A, but using different 
samples of countries.  As shown by the equation 12, aid coefficients are positive and highly 
significant only in Sub-Saharan African countries.  The largest governance quality increases 
are by Liberia, which shows 4.64 point increase in WGI, and by Rwanda, which presents 4.03 
point increase.  In other regions, the results do not show any significance in using 2SLS 
method.  Interestingly, though not having statistical significance, some countries (East Asia 
& Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean, and South Asia) even show negative signs in its 
coefficient, which means that the aid could undermine the governance quality according to the 
geographical location.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is the region on which about 40 percent of world total aid, which 
is 106 billion USD, is poured during 2002-2009.  Figure 2 reports the accumulated aid 
amount of each region.  Also, Table 4 indicates that countries in this region show the highest 
12 
 
Aid/GDP level relative to other countries.  This result could imply that enough accumulated 
aid amount as well as sufficient Aid/GDP ratio is crucial for governance enhancement since it 
requires a large amount of financial resources.  
 
3. Does legal origin matter? 
 
     Several distinct legal traditions were introduced to many countries through colonization 
and imitation.  Along with the legal system, not only rules and regulations, but also 
institutions and ideologies were transplanted concurrently.  In accordance, countries of the 
same legal origin are believed to have similar strategies for economic and social development.   
     Many scholars suggest that adopted ideology influences the political concept of 
organizing private as well as public sector development.  In regards to the private market, 
there is a vast amount of literature arguing that legal origin is important in explaining a 
country’s development in private sector.  For instance, Beck et al. demonstrate that legal 
origin matters for financial development because “legal traditions differ in their ability to 
adjust efficiently to evolving socioeconomic conditions.”18    
     Public sector development could also depend on legal origin.  Porta et al. relate legal 
tradition with government efficiency, arguing that “political heritage matters so much for 
government performance”19  and Treisman also considers legal tradition as one of the 
important factors explaining corruption, which is one of key dimensions of governance.  
Understanding the fact that legal tradition is associated with governance, this chapter will 
focus on the impact of aid on governance under different legal origins and find out the most 
effective tradition for governance enhancement.  
                                           
18
 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine, “Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?” 
NBER Working Paper no. 9379 (2002): 30. 
19
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “The Quality of 
Government,” The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1999): 262. 
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     In general, legal tradition is divided into two categories; civil law and common law.  
The civil law tradition, which is originated in Roman law, is the oldest and the most widely 
spread system amongst all.  It focuses on the active role of centralized government.  
Therefore, many law scholars point out that civil law is associated with “a heavier hand of 
government ownership and regulation”20 which emphasizes the state-leading allocation of 
resources.  French law usually represents the civil law because it is followed by a large 
number of countries and it shows the most distinct features of rules and regulations of this 
system.  German law is also considered to be a civil law but only a small number of 
countries are included in this legal tradition because Germany’s colonial influence did not last 
long.  Socialist legal origin, which is originated in the Soviet Union, is also a sub-tradition of 
civil law system.  However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, many Socialist tradition 
countries reverted to their former law tradition, such as French and German civil law system, 
and many scholars and public officials from these countries even object to be classified in this 
category.  For these reasons, Socialists tradition is excluded from civil law tradition and 
analyzed separately in this paper. 
     On the other hand, common law origin countries produce more market-based policy.  
It is considered to have “better contract enforcement and greater security of property rights”21 
which is more focused on private market outcomes rather than its allocation by government.  
The tradition is originated in the UK and is now followed in many of its former colonies.  
This study tests the hypothesis that there will be a cross-country difference in the impact 
of aid between different law tradition countries.  Except those countries without the 
information, 75 countries are classified into two legal origin groups for this analysis; civil and 
                                           
20
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins,” NBER Working Paper no.13608 (2007): 4. 
21
 Ibid. 
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common law tradition.  Socialist origin is separately considered.  The legal origin data are 
collected from the CIA Factbook and a set of regional dummy variables is additionally 
considered in this analysis.  
Panel C in Table 3 shows that there are strong causal relationships from increased aid to 
improved governance in both civil and common law countries, indicating that aid is 
effectively used in both legal systems.  However, there is a difference in aid’s impact 
between the two groups.  The magnitude of the estimated coefficient for civil law (French 
law and German law) countries is twice as big as that of common law (British law) countries.  
This indicates that, in civil law countries, aid is twice as effective as that in common law 
countries.   
This implies that, in civil law countries, where government’s ownership is stronger and it 
plays more active role in the society than common law countries, the aid for enhancing 
governance is used more effectively.  Since a large portion of foreign aid goes to recipient 
country’s government, strong government ownership could be helpful in aid’s effective usage 
for enhancing its capacity and reducing corruption.    
Another interesting result in this regression is that aid’s impact on governance in Socialist 
legal origin countries is statistically insignificant.  That is, the effort to enhance governance 
through aid in these countries was unsuccessful.  Socialist government represents an ultimate 
control of the society with limited freedom in property rights and many other economic 
activities.  In this kind of society, insignificant result in enhancing governance, which 
includes regulatory quality of promoting private sector, is as expected.  All of these results 
imply that the law heritage does influence the impact of aid on governance. 
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4. Does religious diversity matter? 
 
Existence of competing social groups could also influence the impact of aid on 
governance.  Svensson provides empirical evidence that “foreign aid and windfalls are on 
average associated with higher corruption in countries more likely to suffer from competing 
social groups.”22  In his study, ethnic diversity measure is used as a proxy for the likelihood 
of competing social groups in a country.  Also, Rummel finds out that diverse religious 
population leads to a more violent conflict in a country and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
suggest that religious polarization is an important factor for explaining economic growth.  
Even though religious fractionalization may not be a fully sufficient condition for the 
existence of competing social group, it could be a good guidance in many developing 
countries, where religious conflict is pervasive. 
In this study, three large religious groups in the world are considered; Christian, Muslim, 
and Buddhist.  Christianity is the largest religion with about several hundred Christian 
denominations in the US alone and many more worldwide.
23
  More than 2 billion adherents 
believe this religion and this number is about one third of the world’s entire population.24   
Muslim is the second largest religion with about 1.6 billion adherents.  This is about 23% of 
the world’s population.25  The number of Buddhist is estimated in a huge range difference 
between 350 million and 1.5 billion and this significant variation came from the trend that 
they do not have congregational memberships and do not participate in public ceremonies.
26
   
In order to test whether the competing groups in a country matter for the impact of aid 
                                           
22
 Svensson, “Foreign aid and rent-seeking,” 437. 
23
 USA Churches http://www.usachurches.org/christian-denominations.htm (accessed August 10,2011). 
24
 Christianity at a glance (BBC Religions) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/ataglance/glance.shtml(accessed August 10,2011). 
25
 Pew Research Center, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” Forum on Religion & Public Life 
(2011): 15. 
26
 Buddhist Times http://www.buddhisttimes.net/2008/08/01/buddhist-populations-in-the-world/(accessed 
August 10,2011). 
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on governance, this study uses the percentage of largest religious group in a country as a 
proxy measure of competing social groups.  In the cases where the largest religious group 
comprises less than 50%, a country has high probability to suffer from several powerful 
competing social groups.  On the other hand, when the largest religion is the dominant group, 
a country is less likely to have religious conflict and, therefore, more stable and peaceful 
society.  Among 132 countries, six countries including Bolivia have nearly 100% of 
Christian population.  Muslim is believed by almost all the people in Maldives, Mauritania, 
and Saudi Arabia and 96% of Cambodian is Buddhist.  
Panel D in Table 3 reports the regression results.  Only the countries with major religious 
group comprising between 50% and 90% show very strong positive relationship between aid 
and governance.  By comparison, despite its statistical insignificance, aid coefficient has a 
negative sign in countries with the group comprising less than 50%.  This implies that 
possible religious tension might cause aid to negatively influence governance quality.  
However, the result of the third group is somewhat unexpected.  The hypothesis of this test is 
that the greater the diversity in religious group, the smaller or even the negative impact the aid 
has on governance.  However, countries with largest religious group comprising more than 
90% turns out to have insignificant relationship between aid and governance.  This implies 
that one excessively controlling religion could rather hinder the positive impact of aid on 
governance.    
 
 
5. Six governance indicators 
 
     Until now this study used the composite value of six governance indicators as a 
dependent variable in order to measure the overall quality of governance.  However, having 
17 
 
a closer look at each individual indicator could help evaluating more precise impact of aid on 
each dimension of governance.  The regression results below indicate that the impact of aid 
is dissimilar between six governance areas.   
     Most importantly, only the ‘Political stability and absence of violence’ factor has a 
significant positive relationship with aid when all the countries are considered.  This result 
implies that aid contributes only to maintaining political stability and reducing violence.  
Especially for post-conflict societies, massive amount of aid could support government to 
rebuild stable political environment and help people secure minimum standards of living.  
When other exogenous conditions are concerned, it shows similar results with the previous 
tests using the composite value of governance indicators.  Panel A in Table 5 reports the 
results of regressing the ‘Political stability and absence of violence’ indicator against the same 
independent variables used in the previous tests. 
     ‘Voice and accountability’ and ‘Government effectiveness’ indicators have slightly 
different results from the tests using the composite value.  Aid enhances ‘Voice and 
accountability’ in Sub-Saharan African region or countries where largest religious group 
comprises between 50% and 90%.  In case of ‘Government effectiveness,’ only geographical 
location and legal origin matters.  Sub-Saharan African countries or those with civil law 
tradition have a significant relationship between aid and ‘Government effectiveness.’  Panel 
B and C indicate the regression results of these two indicators respectively. 
     For the last three indicators, ‘Regulatory quality,’ ‘Rule of law’ and ‘Control of 
corruption,’ no significant causal relationship is found in all circumstances.  That is, 
regardless of its geographical location, legal origin, or religious diversity as well as in overall 
countries, aid has been unsuccessful in enhancing the three kinds of governance quality.  
Panel D, E, and F report this insignificant relationship.  Broadly speaking, these three 
dimensions of WGI are closely related to private market where the role of monetary value is 
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important.  “Regulatory quality” implies the “ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.”  “Rule of law” is also related to private market considering the fact that it is 
about the quality of “contract enforcement, property rights” and others.  Finally, “Control of 
corruption” captures the opportunity of “private gain.”27  It could imply that the development 
in governance that is related to private market needs more time and money to be enhanced 
compared to other dimensions.  
  
                                           
27
 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
(accessed July 11, 2011). 
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V. Policy Implication 
 
 
Does aid work as intended?  It does, but only in certain circumstances.  First, the impact 
of aid on governance is inconclusive in overall countries.  There is no general tendency for 
aid to be more efficacious in promoting governance with either small or large value of 
Aid/GDP.  Even though the signs of coefficients are positive and correlation between the two 
exists, the causality lacks statistical significance.  However, when countries are divided into 
three or more groups based on their common exogenous conditions, the results of the same 
analysis are different between groups.  The study suggests that aid has a strong positive 
impact on governance in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries with civil law tradition, 
and countries where the largest religious group comprises more than 50% but less than 90%.  
Also, it is found that, in overall countries, aid provides positive impact only on ‘Political 
stability and absence of violence’ factor.  
These findings should be interpreted with caution.  Basically, aid is better to be allocated 
to countries where it can be used productively.  However, this study does not necessarily 
imply that aid should be spent only for countries with certain condition or it is better to make 
effort to enhance only certain dimension of governance.  Instead, it implies that aid should 
be given selectively with great caution.  Aid practitioners should consider these background 
conditions of recipient countries when establishing an individual aid strategy.  Current aid 
strategy is suitable for some countries with certain conditions, but it may not be enough or 
need different strategies for others.   
Many researchers suggest that aid has a negative impact on the quality of governance 
based on the data over long periods of time.  Especially since 2000s, however, a large 
number of donors have emphasized the importance of governance in development and put 
20 
 
efforts on enhancing governance.  In this sense, analyzing the data since 2002 is meaningful 
that it captures the most current trend.  However, further investigation with longer term data 
needs to be followed for more substantial assessment.  
Donor countries are making more and more efforts to achieve the MDG and eradicate 
poverty in the world.  In order to achieve the MDG at the earliest possible, establishing good 
governance should be a priority before pursuing economic development.  However, good 
governance cannot be achieved only through immediate money or knowledge transfers.  
Since it is a fundamental capacity that needs time to be enhanced, donors’ continuous support 
as well as recipients’ self-disciplined endeavor is required for further success.  
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Figure 1: The ODA volume by year 
 
The bar chart below represents the worldwide ODA disbursement amount by year from 2002 
to 2009 (USD million). The aid amount, which has a policy objective on good governance, is 
indicated in black.  
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Figure 2: Accumulated ODA volume by Geographical Location 
 
 
The pie chart below represents the accumulated ODA amount by geographical location during 
the 2002 – 2009 period. Total 106 billion USD was spent worldwide and Sub-Saharan African 
countries received nearly 40% of total ODA amount. 
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Table 1: Definition of Governance and Governance Indicators 
 
Definition of governance and six governance indicators by the World Bank are provided 
below.  
 
Name Definition 
Governance 
Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised.  It includes the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them. 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
 
Voice and accountability 
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
Political stability and absence of violence 
Political stability and absence of violence measures the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism  
Government effectiveness 
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies.  
Regulatory quality    
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.  
Rule of law 
Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
Control of corruption   
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
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Table 2: Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Definition and summary statistics of key variables are provided below. Panel A defines each 
variable. Panel B provides summary statistics.  
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics 
  N No. of 1 mean median sd min max 
Dependent Variable               
WGI (sum) change 136 
 
0.1382 0.1118 1.7551 -4.7163 5.39 
Voice and accountability change 136 
 
-0.0003 -0.0291 0.3096 -0.8212 1.1241 
Political stability and absence of 
violence change 136 
 
0.0333 0.0661 0.5592 -1.6005 1.4688 
Government effectiveness change 136 
 
0.0287 0.025 0.3792 -1.0544 1.2111 
Regulatory quality change 136 
 
0.0253 0.0678 0.3967 -1.1612 1.4332 
Rule of law change 136 
 
-0.002 0.0017 0.3282 -0.8706 1.1036 
Control of corruption change 136 
 
0.0164 -0.0016 0.3909 -0.9177 1.1433 
Independent Variable              
Aid/GDP 136   1.6341 0.597 3.2111 0.0001 25.1358 
Control Variable               
Population change 136   0.1214 0.1203 0.0807 -0.0902 0.308 
GDP change 136 
 
1.2101 1.0373 0.8188 -0.1063 5.4199 
Initial WGI (sum) 136 
 
-2.7308 -3.0271 3.7476 -11.261 7.5864 
Initial Voice and accountability 136 
 
-0.3913 -0.4517 0.839 -2.0339 1.3717 
Initial Political stability and absence 
of violence 136 
 
-0.3833 -0.3272 0.9023 -2.4193 1.2294 
Initial Government effectiveness 136 
 
-0.4852 -0.5189 0.6301 -2.1116 1.3797 
Initial Regulatory quality 136 
 
-0.4687 -0.4617 0.6998 -2.2446 1.4831 
Initial Rule of law 136 
 
-0.5015 -0.5235 0.69 -1.8944 1.4047 
Initial Control of corruption 136  -0.464 -0.5467 0.6285 -1.7192 1.5632 
Instrumental Variable 
       Initial GNI pc 131  6.8983 6.9939 1.1485 4.382 9.1204 
Infant mortality 125 
 
45.7568 34.58 32.6669 4.8 136.72 
Initial population 136 
 
15.5102 15.7066 2.068 10.7517 20.9704 
Franz zone 136 25 0.1838 0.0000 0.3888 0 1 
UK zone 136 38 0.2794 0.0000 0.4504 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Variable definitions and data sources  
Variables Definition Source 
Aid/GDP 
Official Development Assistance in % of (host) GDP, 
averaged over 2002-2009 
OECD CRS  
and World Bank 
Population change population change in % of initial population World Bank 
GDP change GDP change in % of initial GDP World Bank 
Initial GNIpc Initial (log) value of GNI per capita World Bank 
Infant mortality Infant mortality per 1000 birth, averaged over 2002-2009 World Bank 
Initial population Initial (log) value of total population World Bank 
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Table 3: Determinants of Aid Effectiveness in Enhancing Governance 
 
This table shows regression results of composite value of governance indicator on Aid/GDP in 
different exogenous conditions. Panel A reports the full sample results. Panel B, C and D 
present the sub-sample results in different settings of geographical location, legal origin, and 
religious diversity respectively. Regressions are estimated over the 2002-2009 period. All 
regressions report robust standard errors in parentheses and *, **, and *** respectively 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
 
Panel A. Regression results of full sample 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
= WGI (sum) 
(1) (2) 
OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.144* 0.153 
(0.0779) (0.105) 
Population change -6.839*** -6.570** 
(2.254) (2.561) 
GDP change 0.197 0.309 
(0.184) (0.202) 
Initial WGI(sum) -0.100** -0.105** 
 (0.0453) (0.0505) 
Interaction term Yes Yes 
Observations 136 120 
R-squared 0.148 0.191 
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Panel B. Regression results of sub-samples by geographical location 
Dependent 
Variable 
= WGI(sum) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP -0.118 -0.253 0.439 -1.461 -0.485 -0.584 0.810* 0.786 -0.283 -1.931 0.353*** 0.371*** 
(0.0820) (0.208) (0.565) (1.249) (0.391) (0.453) (0.411) (0.806) (0.531) (3.436) (0.0687) (0.133) 
Population 
change 
3.608 10.72 -7.275 -22.27* -8.845** -5.471 3.317 6.045 9.572 10.96 -7.129* -7.955 
(10.39) (13.41) (8.744) (11.50) (3.960) (4.767) (9.018) (9.378) (20.25) (21.16) (4.063) (4.748) 
GDP change -1.053 -1.313 0.0306 -0.275 -0.578 -0.0962 1.052 -0.229 1.458 -4.627 0.737*** 0.730** 
(0.638) (0.980) (0.227) (0.507) (0.530) (0.491) (1.493) (1.875) (2.631) (8.748) (0.219) (0.323) 
Initial 
WGI(sum) 
-0.513*** -0.532** 0.0500 -0.0600 -0.126 -0.0749 0.0859 0.199 -0.124 0.624 -0.0240 -0.0248 
(0.145) (0.196) (0.200) (0.269) (0.0748) (0.0826) (0.197) (0.246) (0.344) (0.905) (0.0584) (0.0718) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19 17 16 14 31 27 12 10 8 6 46 44 
R-squared 0.451 0.391 0.228 0.148 0.122 0.180 0.377 0.311 0.163 0.417 0.374 0.408 
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Panel C. Regression results of sub-samples by legal origin  
Dependent Variable 
=WGI (sum) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Civil Law Common Law Socialist 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.267*** 0.356** 0.156*** 0.326* 0.642 0.642 
 (0.0927) (0.160) (0.0509) (0.170) (2.745) (2.177) 
Population change -4.783 -5.200 7.362*** 4.247 -16.50 -16.50 
(3.765) (4.682) (2.249) (4.123) (20.37) (18.32) 
GDP change 0.746*** 0.841** 0.418 0.531 0.559 0.559 
(0.256) (0.327) (0.278) (0.307) (0.760) (0.890) 
Initial WGI(sum) -0.143** -0.103 0.0618 0.0692 -0.579 -0.579 
(0.0658) (0.0741) (0.0364) (0.0576) (0.675) (0.635) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52 51 23 22 8 8 
R-squared 0.463 0.445 0.805 0.763 0.749 0.749 
 
 
 
Panel D. Regression results of sub-samples by religious diversity  
Dependent 
Variable  
= WGI(sum) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ≤ 50%  50%<  ≤ 90% > 90% 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP -0.193 -0.625 0.346*** 0.355*** 0.0428 0.253 
(0.337) (0.480) (0.0686) (0.131) (0.0841) (0.189) 
Population change -4.161 1.111 -2.910 -2.897 -4.474 -13.93 
(4.366) (9.473) (3.394) (3.566) (4.841) (9.335) 
GDP change 0.0470 -0.0763 0.716*** 0.730** -0.560 -0.339 
(0.314) (0.581) (0.236) (0.314) (0.391) (0.599) 
Initial WGI(sum) -0.0848 -0.0544 0.0331 0.0294 -0.230** -0.200 
 (0.0761) (0.107) (0.0505) (0.0752) (0.0859) (0.140) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19 19 58 54 49 40 
R-squared 0.506 0.414 0.381 0.442 0.289 0.146 
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Table 4: Averaged Aid/GDP by Geographical Location 
 
The table below reports the averaged Aid/GDP ratio by geographical location during the 2002 
– 2009 period. While the mean value of Aid/GDP in overall countries is 1.63, Sub-Saharan 
African countries recorded 2.82.  
 
  
  N mean median sd min max 
World 136 1.6341 0.597 3.2111 0.0001 25.1358 
East Asia & Pacific 19 2.2906 0.8097 5.7764 0.001 25.1358 
Europe & Central Asia 16 0.8274 1.0558 0.701 0.0208 1.8313 
Latin America & Caribbean 31 0.4408 0.1064 0.7476 0.0025 2.8868 
Middle East & North Africa 12 0.5926 0.1394 0.9779 0.0023 2.9724 
South Asia 8 1.8857 0.8254 3.041 0.133 9.3136 
Sub-Saharan Africa 46 2.8164 1.9564 3.4671 0.0281 17.2975 
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Table 5: Six Governance Indicators 
 
This table shows regression results of six individual governance indicators on Aid/GDP in 
different exogenous conditions. Panel A to F respectively reports the results in different 
settings of geographical location, legal origin, and religious diversity. Regressions are 
estimated over the 2002-2009 period. All regressions report robust standard errors in 
parentheses and *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
 
Panel A. Regression results of ‘Political stability and absence of violence’ 
Dependent Variable 
= Political stability 
and absence of 
violence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Civil law 
Largest religious group 
50%<  ≤90% 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.100*** 0.124*** 0.0770*** 0.115** 0.0804*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0442) (0.0251) (0.0514) (0.0178) (0.0394) 
Population change -2.688*** -3.253** -1.644 -1.821 -1.103 -1.741 
(0.976) (1.597) (1.363) (1.453) (0.844) (1.113) 
GDP change 0.251*** 0.272** 0.350*** 0.376*** 0.208** 0.259*** 
(0.0915) (0.109) (0.0719) (0.103) (0.0915) (0.0942) 
Initial WGI -0.157* -0.138 -0.283*** -0.258*** -0.0913 -0.0286 
(0.0796) (0.0931) (0.0747) (0.0851) (0.0946) (0.0960) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46 44 52 51 58 54 
R-squared 0.387 0.414 0.515 0.494 0.437 0.457 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Regression results of ‘Voice and accountability’ 
Dependent 
Variable = Voice 
and accountability 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Civil law 
Largest religious group 
50%<  ≤90% 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.0585*** 0.0638** 0.0336** 0.0264 0.0595*** 0.0490* 
 (0.0162) (0.0247) (0.0143) (0.0268) (0.0170) (0.0248) 
Population change -1.020 -1.218 -0.834 -0.888 -0.274 -0.195 
(0.888) (0.954) (0.765) (0.809) (0.665) (0.764) 
GDP change 0.0406 0.0439 0.0238 0.0323 0.0586 0.0442 
(0.0517) (0.0626) (0.0420) (0.0559) (0.0597) (0.0653) 
Initial WGI -0.0770 -0.0523 -0.172** -0.125* -0.0391 -0.0378 
(0.0674) (0.0688) (0.0727) (0.0669) (0.0474) (0.0667) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46 44 52 51 58 54 
R-squared 0.299 0.338 0.316 0.285 0.299 0.329 
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Panel C. Regression results of ‘Government effectiveness’ 
Dependent Variable 
= Government 
effectiveness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Civil law 
Largest religious group 
50%<  ≤90% 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.0574*** 0.0714** 0.0456** 0.0513* 0.0454*** 0.0332 
 (0.0126) (0.0290) (0.0186) (0.0287) (0.0132) (0.0283) 
Population change -0.780 -1.141 -0.508 -0.525 -0.0744 0.233 
(1.061) (1.035) (0.853) (0.857) (0.969) (0.764) 
GDP change 0.124** 0.138* 0.108** 0.109* 0.129** 0.125* 
(0.0490) (0.0691) (0.0400) (0.0579) (0.0536) (0.0670) 
Initial WGI 0.0394 0.0447 -0.115* -0.121 0.00529 -0.00336 
(0.101) (0.105) (0.0645) (0.0789) (0.0782) (0.0973) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46 44 52 51 58 54 
R-squared 0.251 0.251 0.383 0.383 0.247 0.314 
 
 
 
Panel D. Regression results of ‘Regulatory quality’ 
Dependent Variable 
= Regulatory 
quality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Civil law 
Largest religious group 
50%<  ≤90% 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.0342** 0.0110 0.0252* 0.0509 0.0481*** 0.0343 
 (0.0144) (0.0326) (0.0143) (0.0402) (0.0163) (0.0298) 
Population change -0.671 -0.177 -0.661 -0.798 -0.579 -0.347 
(1.040) (1.153) (0.936) (1.177) (0.869) (0.826) 
GDP change 0.120** 0.0904 0.0279 0.0502 0.133** 0.118 
(0.0503) (0.0770) (0.0960) (0.0841) (0.0530) (0.0735) 
Initial WGI -0.0834 -0.102 -0.0744 -0.0333 -0.0494 -0.0525 
(0.0836) (0.0979) (0.113) (0.117) (0.0582) (0.0825) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46 44 52 51 58 54 
R-squared 0.175 0.133 0.247 0.231 0.346 0.336 
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Panel E. Regression Results of ‘Rule of law’ 
Dependent Variable 
= Rule of law 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Civil law 
Largest religious group 
50%<  ≤90% 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.0453*** 0.0275 0.0418** 0.0381 0.0508*** 0.0359 
 (0.0130) (0.0253) (0.0173) (0.0319) (0.0151) (0.0274) 
Population change -0.612 -0.247 -0.253 -0.264 -0.256 0.00372 
(0.935) (0.918) (0.854) (0.946) (0.773) (0.748) 
GDP change 0.0898** 0.0620 0.130** 0.140** 0.0919* 0.0729 
(0.0441) (0.0619) (0.0516) (0.0653) (0.0481) (0.0641) 
Initial WGI -0.0672 -0.0988 -0.109 -0.0580 -0.00831 -0.0498 
(0.0710) (0.0781) (0.0793) (0.0841) (0.0669) (0.0877) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46 44 52 51 58 54 
R-squared 0.273 0.257 0.353 0.357 0.290 0.293 
 
 
 
Panel F. Regression Results of ‘Control of corruption’ 
Dependent Variable 
= Control of 
corruption 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa Civil law 
Largest religious group 
50%<  ≤90% 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Aid / GDP 0.0379* 0.0343 0.0326 0.0360 0.0265 0.0235 
(0.0200) (0.0297) (0.0311) (0.0342) (0.0201) (0.0323) 
Population change -1.916* -1.837 -1.195 -1.199 -0.841 -0.678 
(1.081) (1.173) (1.287) (1.095) (0.936) (0.983) 
GDP change 0.0416 0.0304 0.0650 0.0706 0.0272 0.0258 
(0.0662) (0.0756) (0.0688) (0.0732) (0.0654) (0.0831) 
Initial WGI -0.169 -0.185* -0.261*** -0.244*** -0.0753 -0.0951 
(0.109) (0.102) (0.0786) (0.0873) (0.0804) (0.111) 
Interaction term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46 44 52 51 58 54 
R-squared 0.161 0.179 0.462 0.440 0.141 0.148 
 
